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however, demand a repudiation of the justificationist's general princi 
ples. "He will still hold that a statement about the past can be true only 
in virtue of an actual or possible direct observation of it. But he will 
take a more realist attitude to whether such a direct verification was or 
could have been carried out" (p. 70). 
"The Metaphysics of Time" offers a stimulating discussion of the four 
possible metaphysical positions regarding the present, past, and future: 
(1) only the present is real; (2) the future is real, but the past is not; (3) 
the past is part of reality, the future is not; (4) the past and future are 
both real. Dummett offers trenchant objections to the arguments of the 
first three positions and then defends the reality of past and future as 
"regions of reality determined, at any given moment by our temporal 
perspective, as it is at that moment" (p. 86). While God apprehends 
things as they really are in themselves, we humans cannot attain a de 
scription of reality as wholly independent of our temporal, changing ex 
perience. In view of these new reflections, Dummett's brief discussion 
of the metaphysical implications for theistic belief does not (nor can it 
in this short essay) engage the issues raised by Dummett's philosophical 
critics on these theistic questions. And he acknowledges that the theo 
logians may well "spurn" his speculations. This writer believes, rather, 
that more theologians (and historians) ought to be engaged by Dum 
mett's reflections on the past and future, for he offers much that could 
stimulate and challenge their thinking.?James C. Livingston, The Col 
lege of William and Mary. 
Feinberg, Joel. Problems at the Roots of Law: Essays in Legal and Political 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. vii + 199 pp. Cloth, 
$45.00?This is, regrettably, the last book from a prolific writer, pub 
lished only a few months before his death in March of 2004. Joel 
Feinberg was a widely respected author and teacher at the University of 
Arizona where he held the Regents professorship in philosophy. His 
most influential works include his massive four-volume study of harm 
and punishment in criminal law, and several collections of his essays, of 
which the present volume is the fourth. Throughout his writings, 
Feinberg's work explores the tense relationship between autonomy and 
paternalism in a liberal state, particularly as relevant to questions of 
public harm and criminal responsibility. 
In this book Feinberg presents seven essays that explore various top 
ics in law, morality, and political theory. The first two essays deal with 
questions about the relationship between morality and legal theory. The 
first essay, on natural law jurisprudence, offers a compact introduction 
to the debate between legal positivists (notably H. L. A. Hart) and natu 
ral law thinkers (notably Lon Fuller and Lloyd L. Weinreb). Focusing on 
the fugitive slave cases during the American Civil War, Feinberg argues 
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that the unquestionable immorality of slavery suggests the illegitimacy 
of laws institutionalizing it, and thus at least in extreme cases the legiti 
macy of a law can turn on the morality of the institutions it serves. 
In the second essay Feinberg develops a defense of a role for moral 
rights in political and legal decision-making. Feinberg argues against 
the view, espoused by theorists like Raymond Frey, who believe that a 
claim of moral right is merely a confused claim of legal rights. Feinberg 
disagrees, arguing that in familiar language it is common to speak of 
moral rights preceding their legal recognition (for example, women had 
a moral right to vote before having a legal one), sometimes moral rights 
conflict with law and legal institutions (for example, the moral right to 
rebellion), and that many commonplace moral rights are enjoyed with 
out the need for state recognition (for example, being treated with re 
spect). Feinberg further argues that since moral principles derive from 
reason, they require no institutional base. Unfortunately, however, 
Feinberg does not provide or even intimate how it is that reason pro 
vides justification for moral principles. He realizes the need for some 
sort of metaethical account, but he asserts that it is beyond the scope of 
his essay. 
The next three essays deal with a number of particular legal issues, 
criminal entrapment, attempted criminal acts, and the justification of 
government subsidies for the arts. Criminal entrapment occurs when 
government agents provide the circumstances for the commission of a 
crime that might not otherwise have been committed. Feinberg uses his 
discussion of the criminal law of entrapment to explore whether it is 
conceptually possible for one person to cause another person to commit 
a voluntary act. Feinberg argues that if the government is permitted ran 
domly to test the propensities of individuals to commit criminal acts, 
then the government might pose a greater danger to autonomy than the 
would-be criminals that it would seek to ferret out. Similarly, in an es 
say on criminal attempt, Feinberg examines the ancient problem of pun 
ishing those who fail in an attempt to commit a crime. Focusing on 
moral culpability rather than actual harm committed, Feinberg argues 
for greater proportionality in punishing attempted crimes and success 
ful criminal acts. He suggests that by trying to void moral concepts, re 
cent philosophers have muddled the issue. In the essay on justification 
of government subsidies for the arts, he argues that any theory of justifi 
cation for government subsidies rests on a corresponding theory of po 
litical liberty. 
The final two essays consider perpetrators of cruel and senseless 
crimes. Feinberg observes that such perpetrators are described as ei 
ther mentally ill or "sheer evil." Those advocating the medical view of 
illness tend to find the moral language of evil to be vague, and those ad 
vocating evil as the proper descriptor find the medical definition to be 
obscure. Feinberg surveys a number of approaches to understanding 
"sheer evil" and mental illness, arguing that the distinctions between 
normal and evil and healthy and ill are complex and richly textured. In 
the last essay he briefly explores the intermixing influence that psychol 
ogy and philosophy have had in working out conceptualizations of aber 
rant behavior. 
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At times, these essays could provide more historical context, particu 
larly of the complex understandings of law, freedom, evil, health, and 
sin as developed by ancient and medieval philosophers and theologians. 
The essays on the moral and psychological meanings of evil, for exam 
ple, could benefit in particular from a discussion of Christian thinkers 
like Augustine, whose conceptualization of evil had influence on a wide 
range of modern theorists, from Freud to Hannah Arendt. At times, 
Feinberg seems to grope to rediscover concepts and arguments that 
have been debated for centuries.?Kevin Lee, Ave Maria School of Law. 
Feist, Richard, Editor. Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives. 
Philosophica, vol. 55. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004. x + 230 
pp. Cloth, $35.00?This collection appears to have begun life as a con 
ference volume, which helps explain the geographical spread of the con 
tributors (four are at institutions in Montreal, one in Ottawa, one at the 
University of Western Ontario, and the remaining four from Europe). 
The geography is nonetheless suggestive, insofar as Ottawa and Quebec 
represent an area of overlap between the English-speaking and Conti 
nental European philosophical worlds. For many reasons, a consider 
ation of Husserl's views on the sciences falls within a similar area of 
overlap in intellectual space (although, with one possible exception, all 
contributions to this volume are sufficiently "analytic" in style to be eas 
ily accessible to analytically trained readers). 
It should be said that the title is slightly misleading. Most of the chap 
ters in fact focus on either mathematics (which in English, at least, is 
not usually called a "science"), the mathematical foundations of physics, 
or epistemological issues about science in general (as opposed to "the 
sciences" individually). This focus is unsurprising, given Husserl's well 
known interest in both mathematics and such general epistemological 
issues. For the same reason, however, it makes the collection some 
what less exciting than the title might suggest. 
Nevertheless, the volume as it is contains some very interesting con 
tributions. I found this especially true of those in part 2 ("Phenomenol 
ogy, Mathematics, and Physics"). All five discuss the relationship be 
tween Husserl's views and those of philosophically minded 
mathematicians (and mathematical physicists) who influenced or were 
influenced by his thought. Particularly prominent is Herman Weyl, ex 
plicitly in the contributions by Feist ("Husserl and Weyl: Phenomenol 
ogy, Mathematics, and Physics") and John Bell ("Herman Weyl's Later 
Philosophical Views: His Divergence from Husserl"), but also in that of 
Mathieu Marion ("Husserl's Legacy in the Philosophy of Mathematics: 
From Realism to Predicativism"). Those three chapters have to do 
mostly with the reception of and reaction to Husserl's work (although 
Marion is also concerned to adjudicate between Weyl's early predicativ 
ist reading of Husserl and G?del's realist one). The remaining two aim 
more squarely at understanding Husserl's own thought and placing it 
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